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ABSTRACT
The vast majority of case law establishes that, in the absence of a
specific agreement to the contrary, the deposit of funds into a bank
creates a debtor-creditor relationship, pursuant to which depositors
are deemed creditors of their respective banks. In effect, depositors
loan their deposits to banks, which may then use such deposits for
ordinary banking activities, including investment and lending,
speculative or otherwise. This Article examines the case history
pertaining to this legal classification and proposes that such case
history does not comport with depositor intent, is not supported by
purportedly relevant legal premises (as illustrated by an analogy to
deposits of commodities in the agricultural context), and does not
justify the conclusion that bank deposits give rise to debtor-creditor
relationships.
The Article proceeds to explore the practical
consequences of the anomalous legal classification of bank deposits
as loans instead of the natural and obvious alternative—bailments.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 544
I. RELEVANT TERMINOLOGY AND ORIGIN OF DEFAULT LEGAL
RULE ............................................................................................ 546
II. HISTORICAL REASONS FOR DEFAULT LEGAL RULE ...................... 551
III. DEPOSITS OF FUNGIBLE, COMMINGLED GOODS IN THE
AGRICULTURAL CONTEXT........................................................... 555
* Timothy C. Harker is a Deputy Attorney General with New Jersey’s Office of the
Attorney General, where he prosecutes complex white collar crimes. Prior to that, he
was an associate in the private equity and hedge fund practice group of Willkie Farr &
Gallagher LLP. He obtained a J.D. from the University of Michigan in 2007, and a
B.S. in Information Technology and Statistics from the University of Maryland in 2002.
The views expressed herein are the author’s own.

543

544

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XIX

IV. FRACTIONAL RESERVE BANKING ................................................. 559
V. RESERVE REQUIREMENTS, DEPOSIT INSURANCE, AND THE
RACE TO THE BOTTOM ................................................................ 562
VI. SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ................ 566
A. DEPOSIT GUARANTEES: INSURANCE OR TRANSFER
PAYMENTS? ............................................................................ 567
B. BANK RUNS, DEPOSIT INSURANCE, AND CIRCULAR
REASONING ............................................................................. 570
C. ARTIFICIAL CREDIT CREATION AND SUBOPTIMAL
INVESTMENT AND LENDING..................................................... 572
D. SURREPTITIOUS SOCIAL POLICY................................................ 576
E. MORAL HAZARD AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM INSTABILITY ........... 577
F. DILUTION OF THE VALUE OF MONEY BY DEPOSIT INSURANCE
PAYOUTS................................................................................. 580
G. DILUTION OF THE VALUE OF MONEY FROM LOANS AND
INVESTMENTS MADE POSSIBLE BY DEPOSIT INSURANCE ......... 582
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 584
INTRODUCTION
A client walks into a bank with the intention of depositing personal
or business funds. The bank’s teller gladly accepts the deposit, credits
the client’s account accordingly, and the client departs content that what
transpired was an ordinary-course banking transaction. Simultaneously,
however, a curious phenomenon occurs, one which effectively
transforms the legal nature of the transaction into something very
different from that which our unwary depositor intends. That curious
phenomenon, which willfully ignores the nature of the deposit as
understood by both parties, subverts the intentions of only one party.
What the depositor intends to be in the nature of a bailment, the law
transforms into a loan; where ordinary people expect a bailor-bailee
relationship, the law creates a creditor and a debtor. Title to the
deposited funds passes from the depositor to the bank, and usually only
the bank knows it. Upon this legal transformation is built the leviathan
that is the global banking system.
This Article evaluates the reasons for the anomalous legal
classification of ordinary bank deposits as loans instead of bailments,
the reasons for treating depositors as creditors to banks, and the
consequences of classifying banks as debtors to depositors. This Article
concludes that (i) there is no legal justification for treating ordinary bank
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deposits as loans, depositors as creditors, or banks as debtors in the
ordinary deposit context; (ii) the default legal relationship that exists
between a depositor and a bank should be that of bailor and bailee—a
loan arising only by express agreement, in accordance with depositors’
expectations; (iii) the fungible nature of deposits, and the fact of
commingling, pose no legal or practical obstacles for the robust law of
bailments and its application to the deposit context; and (iv) the
classification of ordinary deposits as loans pursuant to which banks
acquire title to deposited funds has costly social, economic, and legal
consequences.
Part I of this Article describes the relevant terminology and then
proceeds to examine the case history pertaining to the legal nature of
deposits in the banking context, particularly during the 19th century.
Part I also illustrates that the precedent established by applicable 19thcentury case law, a precedent codified during the 20th century by many
states through their respective banking regulations, is essential to the
modern banking system, but conflicts with depositors’ intentions and
creates an inherent discrepancy between the practical relationship, on
the one hand, and the legal relationship, on the other, between depositors
and banks.
Part II examines the historical reasons underlying the case law
classifying an ordinary bank deposit as a loan instead of a bailment in
the absence of an agreement to the contrary and proceeds to evaluate the
relative merits of the myriad legal justifications for this classification
proffered by various state and federal courts.
Part III provides a legal justification for treating deposits as
bailments. In particular, Part III explores the nature of deposits of
agricultural goods in the commodity warehouse context and shows that
such transactions are analogous to the deposit of money in the banking
context. The part then examines the history of agricultural transactions
and the legal relationship that exists between farmers (or similarly
situated parties) and warehouse operators pursuant to case law and
applicable statutory law. Part III concludes by arguing that there is no
legal justification for differentiating between money deposits in the
banking context and commodity deposits in the agricultural context.
Part IV introduces the ubiquitous practice of fractional reserve
banking and explains that its existence depends on the default legal
classification of an ordinary deposit as a loan. Part IV should be
understood as the crux of the article that explains the connection
between the legal classification of ordinary demand deposits as loans (as
described in Parts I, II, and III) and the consequences of such
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classification (as described in Parts V, and VI). In particular, Part IV
hypothesizes that the primary intended purpose of the default legal
classification was the retroactive legitimization of the widespread but
legally dubious use of deposited funds by banks for investment and
lending purposes.
Part V employs Aesop’s fable of the Ant and the Grasshopper to
illustrate that, in the banking context, the prudence of 100% reserve
banks is undermined by the existence of fractional reserve banks. Part
V proceeds to show that the rise of deposit insurance marginalizes 100%
reserve banks by rendering them superfluous, leaving fractional reserve
banks as the only practical banking alternative.
Part VI concludes this Article by discussing some of the
consequences of the anomalous classification of ordinary demand
deposits as loans instead of bailments together with the implementation
of systematic deposit insurance. The discussion addresses bank
insolvency, speculative and excessive banking activity (i.e., lending and
investment), inflation, moral hazard, systemic financial instability, and
other ramifications for deposit insurance, disguised social policy, and
economic and social disruption.
I. RELEVANT TERMINOLOGY AND ORIGIN OF DEFAULT LEGAL RULE
In the ordinary deposit context and in the absence of express
agreement to the contrary, title to deposited funds automatically passes
from the depositor to the bank in what is typically called a “general
deposit.” In the case of general deposits, a bank assumes the legal
obligations of a debtor to the depositor in respect of the deposited funds,
and undertakes a contractual or legal obligation to return the deposited
funds “on demand” or, in the case of “time deposits,” subject to certain
restrictions identified in Part IV below. Prior to the return of deposited
funds, however, the bank in the general deposit context may use the
available funds for its general business purposes including lending and
investment, subject to applicable federal and state banking regulations.
Conversely, if a depositor and a bank agree explicitly to establish a
bailment, a “special deposit” arises where title to the deposited funds
remains with the depositor, and the bank assumes the legal obligations
of a bailee. For example, under New York law a “bailment of money is
created . . . when a special or specific bank account is created, title to the
funds remains with the account holder, and the funds are separated from
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other deposits.”1 In the special deposit context, the bank is not
permitted to use deposited funds for its general business purposes. The
process by which these ordinary deposits came to be classified as loans
instead of bailments is of critical importance. In the 1864 case Marine
Bank v. Fulton, the Supreme Court observed:
All deposits made with bankers may be divided into two classes,
namely, those in which the bank becomes a bailee of the depositor,
the title of the thing deposited remaining with the latter; and that
other kind of deposit of money peculiar to the banking business, in
which the depositor, for his own convenience, parts with the title to
his money, and loans it to the banker; and the latter, in consideration
of the loan of the money and the right to use it for his own profit,
2
agrees to refund the same amount, or any part thereof, on demand.

Most jurisdictions now use the “special deposit” / “general deposit”
framework to make the substantive distinction between a bailment and a
loan, respectively; and, since the particular terminology used is not
crucial to the central thesis, this Article will use the terms “special
deposit” and “bailment” interchangeably, and the terms “general
deposit” and “loan” interchangeably.3
Having established the possible alternatives, subsequent courts set
forth to explain the procedure for determining whether “a deposit was
made without condition or special agreement”; i.e., whether it was
special or general, a bailment or a loan.4 In the Second and Sixth
Circuits, that procedure amounts to an evaluation of depositor intent:
“[w]hether a deposit in a bank is general or special depends upon the
mutual understanding and intention of the parties at the time such
deposit is made.”5 By supposition, however, the steps thus far
1. Rozsa v. May Davis Grp., Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 526, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(emphasis added); see also Warren v. Nix, 135 S.W. 896 (Ark. 1911), Woodhouse v.
Crandall, 64 N.E. 292 (Ill. 1902), Kimmel v. Dickson, 58 N.W. 561 (S.D. 1894).
2. Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank, 69 U.S. 252, 256 (1864).
3. But see Nix, 135 S.W. at 898 (“But we think there is a clear distinction between
a loan and a general deposit. When a loan is made, the money is borrowed for a fixed
time, and the borrower promises to repay such amount at a fixed future date. But a
general deposit is payable upon demand; in effect, the money thus deposited is kept
under the control of the depositor, because it must be kept at all times subject to be paid
upon his check. The money so deposited or its actual equivalent is returned to the
depositor upon demand.”).
4. Thompson v. Riggs, 72 U.S. 663, 678 (1866).
5. Peoples Westchester Sav. Bank v. F.D.I.C., 961 F.2d 327, 330 (2d Cir. 1992)
(quoting Keyes v. Paducah & I.R. Co., 61 F.2d 611, 613 (6th Cir. 1932)).
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elaborated do not result in a definitive legal classification of the nature
of the deposit, precisely because the depositor and the bank do not have
a mutual understanding or intent.6 What is needed (at least from the
bank’s perspective) is a default rule that classifies the deposit as general,
not specific. Courts nationwide eagerly obliged: the Second,7 Ninth,8
and Tenth9 Circuits cite the Sixth Circuit for the proposition that “a
deposit made in the ordinary course of business is presumed to be
general.”10 District and state courts followed suit: in New York,
“[a]bsent evidence of intent, New York law presumes that deposits are
general rather than specific”;11 under Florida law, “[a] bank becomes the
absolute owner of money deposited with it . . . in the absence of any
special agreement importing a different character into the transaction,
and the relationship between the parties is simply that of debtor and
creditor”;12 under South Carolina law, “[i]t is an important part of the
business of banking to receive deposits; but when they are received,
unless there are stipulations to the contrary, they belong to the bank,
become a part of its general funds, and can be loaned by it as other
moneys [sic]”;13 in Arkansas, “the general rule [is], that where money . .
. is deposited with a bank . . . the law presumes it to be a general deposit,
until the contrary appears”;14 in Texas, “[w]hen money . . . is deposited
in a bank without any special agreement . . . the relation of debtor and
creditor is created between the bank and the depositor, and the deposit is

6. To be precise, I assume the depositor believes her deposit to be a bailment and
that the bank understands it to be a loan. I add that the bank likely understands that the
depositor is subject to a mistaken belief regarding the legal classification of her deposit.
See, e.g., Nix, 135 S.W. at 898–99 (“Certainly, the thousands who daily deliver money
to banks for safekeeping and return in corresponding currency do not regard the
transaction as a loan, nor do they so speak of it.”) (quoting Allibone v. Ames, 68 N.W.
165, 166 (S.D. 1896)).
7. Peoples Westchester Sav. Bank, 961 F.2d at 330.
8. Thompson v. Beitia, 69 F.2d 356, 358 (9th Cir. 1934) (quoting N. Sugar Corp.
v. Thompson, 13 F.2d 829, 831 (8th Cir. 1926)).
9. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Variable Life Annuity Life Ins. Co., 373 F.3d
1100, 1107 (10th Cir. 2004).
10. Keyes, 61 F.2d at 613.
11. Rozsa v. May Davis Grp., Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 526, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
12. City of Miami v. Shutts, 51 So. 929, 931 (Fla. 1910) (quoting Camp v. First
Nat’l Bank of Ocala, 33 So. 241, 243 (Fla. 1902)).
13. Leaphart v. Commercial Bank of Columbia, 23 S.E. 939, 941 (S.C. 1896).
14. Dawson v. Real Estate Bank, 5 Ark. 283, 297 (1843).
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general”;15 and in California, “[i]t is unquestionably true that one
making a general deposit with a bank in the usual course of business
parts with title to the moneys deposited.”16
Further, in order that the legal presumption inhere with practical
substance, courts drove the point home: again in the Second and Ninth
Circuits, “the burden of proof is on the depositor to overcome such
presumption by proving that the deposit was . . . a special deposit, or a
deposit for a specific purpose, as distinguished from a general
deposit”;17 in the Southern District of New York “[w]here there is no
written contract, the party asserting a bailment must establish, in light of
all the circumstances, that the parties agreed to a contract with definite
terms”;18 and, in the Eighth Circuit, “a deposit made in the ordinary
course of business is presumed to be general, and the burden of proof is
upon the depositor to overcome such presumption by proving that the
deposit was made upon such terms and conditions as to constitute it [sic]
a special deposit or a deposit for a specific purpose, as distinguished
from a general deposit.”19 Perhaps tellingly, the Third Circuit
sidestepped the perfunctory evaluation of depositor intent, and
straightforwardly declared “money deposited in a bank becomes the
property of the bank in the sense that the bank may use it as its own.”20
In effect, the above case law and the ensuing state legislation
ensures that in the absence of an agreement between the parties, a
deposit is subject to a legal presumption that determines the respective
rights of each party in connection with their deposits. More specifically,
the process of (i) distinguishing between possible classifications, (ii)
assessing the mutual intent of the parties, and (iii) establishing a default
rule that classifies deposits as general in the absence of evidence of the
parties’ intent, effectively renders into loans the vast majority of
deposits made in the nation’s banks precisely by ignoring depositors’
intentions, notwithstanding the self-evident observation that most

15. McBride v. Am. Ry. & Lighting Co., 127 S.W. 229, 232 (Tex. Civ. App.
1910).
16. Anderson v. Pac. Bank, 44 P. 1063 (Cal. 1896).
17. Peoples Westchester Sav. Bank v. F.D.I.C., 961 F.2d 327, 330 (2d Cir. 1992)
(quoting Keyes v. Paducah & I.R. Co., 61 F.2d 611, 613 (6th Cir. 1932)); Thompson v.
Beitia, 69 F.2d 356, 358 (9th Cir. 1934) (quoting Keyes, 61 F.2d at 613)).
18. Rozsa v. May Davis Grp., Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 526, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
19. N. Sugar Corp. v. Thompson, 13 F.2d 829, 831 (8th Cir. 1926).
20. In re Erie Forge & Steel Corp., 456 F.2d 801, 804 (3d Cir. 1972).
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depositors do not intend to be creditors to their respective banks.21
Thus, under most circumstances, the first two steps of the abovedescribed process constitute perfunctory gestures that suggest a lawful
basis exists for classifying a deposit in a manner that conflicts with the
intentions and understanding of ordinary depositors. Accordingly, what
ultimately matters is the third step—the default legal conclusion that
deposited funds are general deposits (i.e., loans from depositors to
banks) coupled with the requirement that depositors bear the burden of
disproving such conclusion by proffering explicit evidence of agreement
to the contrary. That step seems to be an aberration of the common law,
unjustified by recourse to the mutual understanding of both parties as
illustrated by the legal relationship recognized to exist between
warehouse operators and those who deposit fungible commodities into
such warehouses, as described in Part III infra.
The perfunctory nature of the process is evidenced by the Supreme
Court’s 1866 observation, only two years after Marine Bank, that it was
“well settled” law that if a deposit was “made without condition or
special agreement of any kind . . . the depositor parts with the title to his
money, and loans it to the bank.”22 Two years is apparently ample time
to gloss over extant precedent in an otherwise analogous field of law;
i.e., the law of bailments in the context of deposits of fungible
agricultural goods, and to ordain that an anomalous legal conclusion is
“well settled.” Indeed, most observers would probably not agree that it
“is axiomatic that the relationship between a bank and its depositor
arising out of a general deposit is that of a debtor and creditor.”23 To
argue as much is to boot-strap the “axiom,” without which the
reasonably presumed legal relationship between a depositor and a bank
is that of bailor to bailee, not creditor to debtor.24 Having established
the genesis of the default legal rule that renders ordinary deposits into
21. Warren v. Nix, 97 Ark. 374, 381 (1911) (“Ordinarily the depositor understands
that he is leaving his money for safekeeping, to be returned upon his order upon
demand, and not that the identical pieces of money left with the bank will be returned,
but only its equivalent. He does not ordinarily understand that he is making a loan to
the bank when he makes a deposit therein.”).
22. Thompson v. Riggs, 72 U.S. 663, 678 (1866).
23. Morse v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 142 Cal. App. 3d 228, 232 (Ct. App. 1983).
24. The Supreme Court’s 1966 statement that “[t]he relationship of bank and
depositor is that of debtor and creditor, founded upon contract” is instructive to the
extent it fails even to mention the intent of the parties. Bank of Marin v. England, 385
U.S. 99, 101 (1966).
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loans, and by corollary renders ordinary depositors into lenders, we’re
left wondering why. Subsequent courts attempted to answer this
question. But, as Part II demonstrates, these attempts did little more
than restate the conclusion.
II. HISTORICAL REASONS FOR DEFAULT LEGAL RULE
Historically, courts classified deposits as loans in part because they
possessed a narrow understanding of bailments as applied exclusively to
fungible goods. For example, well more than a century ago, an Illinois
appeals court in Mutual Accident Association of the Northwest v.
Jacobs, stated that if “there is no obligation to restore the specific
article, and the receiver is at liberty to return another thing of equal
value, the contract is not that of bailment.”25 Seventy years later, using
the terminology from Part I, the Third Circuit applied similar reasoning
to define bailor-bailee relationships in the banking context: “A ‘special’
deposit or account is one where the identical money or thing deposited is
to be kept safe and returned as deposited. The relation of debtor and
creditor is not created, but that of bailor and bailee is, title remaining in
the bailor.”26
In 1866, twenty-five years before Jacobs, the Supreme Court in
Thompson v. Riggs lent its weight to a narrow definition of bailments:
deposits, the Court stated in dicta, “may be made under circumstances
where the legal conclusion would be that the title to the thing deposited
remained with the depositor, and in that case the bank would become the
bailee of the depositor, and the latter might rightfully demand the
identical money deposited as his property.”27 The supposition is, of
course, that if a bailment exists, the bailor must have the right to demand
that the identical money deposited be returned.28 By implication, no
commingling of the funds can occur, a conclusion that courts have
acknowledged: “We also approve the principle . . . that where a
depositor gives the bank the right to commingle his deposit with other
25. Mut. Accident Ass’n of Nw. v. Jacobs, 43 Ill. App. Ct. 340, 343 (1891)
(quoting Mallory v. Willis, 4 N.Y. 76 (N.Y. 1850)).
26. In re A.M. Townson & Co., 283 F.2d 449, 453 (3d Cir. 1960).
27. Riggs, 72 U.S. at 678 (emphasis added).
28. See, e.g., Mystic Color Lab, Inc. v. Auctions Worldwide, LLC, 284 Conn. 408,
420 (2007) (stating that if a putative bailee is not required to return the identical
deposited items, but may instead deliver any items of equal value, there is no bailment);
see also, State v. Deutsch, 77 N.J.L. 292, 297 (Sup. Ct. 1909); Woodhouse v. Crandall,
197 Ill. 104, 109 (1902).
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funds owned by the bank, he creates only a general deposit whose funds
the bank is authorized to use and disburse as it sees fit.”29
The reasoning in Jacobs comports with the Supreme Court’s
statement in Thompson, as illustrated by the Jacobs Court’s explanation
that because a $6,000 deposit was not a bailment (since the specific
funds were not to be returned), it was therefore “more in the nature of a
loan” and that “the relation of debtor and creditor [was] created by the
transaction.”30 This reasoning is correct, as far as it goes—a deposit
must be either a bailment or a loan, and it cannot be both. That
conclusion also comports with the Supreme Court’s earlier holding in
Marine Bank.31 But the reasoning also presupposes incorrectly that if
the identical units of deposited currency are not to be returned (or cannot
be returned, for practical reasons) then the deposit must not be a
bailment. As explained below, this conclusion does not follow from the
premise that a deposit must be either a bailment or a loan, but not both,
and the Court provides no explanation for this logical leap. Thus,
observers are left to wonder whether a definition of “bailments” that
fails to account for fungible goods is sufficiently robust in a modern
economy.
To that end, the Jacobs Court’s description of the subject deposit
suggests the possibility that it was aware of the logical leap, but, having
determined that the deposit was not a bailment, had no alternative other
than to use ambiguous language to conclude that the deposit was “in the
nature of a loan”; but, apparently not a loan.32 Such equivocation is
more than merely semantic and reflects the essence of the underlying
dilemma; namely, everybody knows that depositors believe their
deposits to be in the nature of a bailment, but all banks operate as
though such deposits are loans. Thus, phrases like “in the nature of”
seem to be thinly-veiled attempts to skirt an essential legal issue. Other
courts have wrestled with the same difficulty. For example, the Third
Circuit in In re Erie Forge & Steel Corp. stated that “money deposited
in a bank becomes the property of the bank in the sense that the bank
may use it as its own.”33 This is consistent with the creditor-debtor
29.
30.
31.
32.

Hudnall v. Tyler Bank & Trust Co., 458 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. 1970).
Jacobs, 43 Ill. App. Ct. at 346.
Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank, 69 U.S. 252, 256 (N.Y. 1864).
Jacobs, 43 Ill. App. Ct. at 346; see also, Downes v. Phoenix Bank, 6 Hill 297,
300 (1844) (acknowledging some difficulty in denying that an ordinary bank deposit
appears to be a bailment).
33. In re Erie Forge & Steel Corp., 456 F.2d 801, 804 (3d Cir. 1972).
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relationship, pursuant to which title to deposited funds changes hands,
subject to an explicit or tacit contract to return such funds on demand.
However, only one sentence later, the Third Circuit elaborated that “the
mere deposit of money in a bank does not amount to a transfer of
property.”34 This is exactly the crux of the issue, and the Court’s second
point can’t be reconciled with the simultaneous conclusion that a
depositor is a creditor and not a bailor, as exemplified by the first point.
Either title to deposited funds remains with the depositor, as in the
bailment context, or it passes to the bank, as in the creditor context.
Indeed, this dilemma has been swept under the rug by the largest broom
in the land. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Supreme Court
stated:
A deposit of money to one’s credit in a bank . . . creates at the same
time, on the part of the bank, an obligation to pay the amount of the
deposit as soon as the depositor may see fit to draw a check against
it. It is not a transfer of property as a payment, pledge, mortgage,
35
gift, or security. It is true that it creates a debt . . . .

Dissecting the Court’s statements unveils a semantic and logical
quagmire. The first sentence is ambiguous, and it is not clear whether
title to deposited funds changes hands. The ambiguity is apparently
resolved in the second sentence, as the Court states that deposits are not
transfers of property. This implies that the deposit must be a bailment,
since no property is transferred; i.e., title to the property remains with
the depositor. But, alas, appearances are deceiving, as evidenced by the
Court’s confusing final statement that the deposit “creates a debt,”
notwithstanding the fact that there is no transfer of title to the property.
This confusion is reminiscent of Jacobs. Recall that in Jacobs, an
Illinois appeals court held that a deposit was a loan because there was no
agreement to return the specific deposited money. But, the Jacobs Court
made its task unnecessarily difficult, at least to the extent that buried in
its opinion are facts that substantiate independently its holding: “it was
the manifest intention of the parties that the $6,000 was not to be kept as
a special deposit . . . and to remain unused in the [bank] . . . , but that it
was to be . . . used in the regular . . . business” of the bank.36 If the
intention of the parties regarding the status of the deposit was
“manifest,” the Court’s legal gymnastics presumably were gratuitous.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
New York Cnty. Nat. Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138, 147 (1904).
Jacobs, 43 Ill. App. Ct. at 345–46.
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Such intention would be established by facts that, at the appellate level,
were presumed true, and would be sufficient to reach the conclusion that
the deposit constituted a loan without resort to a default rule classifying
them as such. In other words, the ultimate issue is precisely whether a
depositor intends that the bank use deposited funds for its business
purposes. If so, the deposit is a loan; if not, the deposit is a bailment.
Creditors intend that debtors use credited funds, bailors do not.
In effect, the assumption that it is practically untenable to require
banks to return identical deposits of currency leads to the reasonable
conclusion that banks need only return currency deposits of equal
value.37 That is, once courts concluded that depositors were indifferent
to the return of identical units of currency (as opposed to units of equal
value), a conveniently narrow conception of bailments induced these
courts unnecessarily to conclude that title to deposited funds must pass
from depositors to banks. Thereafter, courts assumed that deposits of
currency must be classified as general deposits as opposed to specific
deposits.38 After all, if a bailment requires that the specific article
deposited also be returned, and banks are commingling literally billions
of homogenous deposits,39 then there is no practical way to conclude
that such deposits constitute bailments, if only because banks cannot
really track title. Banking would grind to a halt as managers attempted
to account for each depositor’s legal title to specific bills. This explains
the conclusion that title to deposited funds must pass from depositors to
banks. Such reasoning reduces to the following form: (i) initially,
depositors have title to their specific deposits; (ii) then, bankers
commingle these deposits en masse, and in the process lose track of
title; therefore, (iii) courts concluded that depositors must lose title to
their specific deposits. With time, clause (i) is forgotten and the
affirming-the-consequent nature of the above logical structure is
resolved.
But the issue needn’t be nearly so messy, and bailments are far
more flexible as legal devices than courts suppose or banks prefer.
Indeed, the practical inability to return the specific fungible deposit (i.e.,
37. Part VI, infra, explains that although returned deposits will have the same
nominal or “face” value, they usually will not possess the same “real” value as that
which inhered in the funds at the time of deposit.
38. See, e.g., Hossain v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 15 F. App’x 745, 748 (10th
Cir. 2001) (quoting Bloomheart v. Foster, 221 P. 279, 281 (Kan. 1923)).
39. Homogenous for all practical purposes, of course, each bill is distinct at least to
the extent that it has a unique serial number.
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the dollar bill with the same serial number) poses no conceptual
difficulty for the law of bailments. Part III, infra, practically and legally
debunks the notion that bailments require bailees to independently track
title to fungible, commingled deposits, and sets the stage for a
restoration of the reasonable and widely-held understanding that
ordinary deposits are bailments, not loans.
III. DEPOSITS OF FUNGIBLE, COMMINGLED GOODS IN THE
AGRICULTURAL CONTEXT
The practical relationship that exists between the depositors of
fungible agricultural goods40 and the warehouses that store such goods is
analogous to the practical relationship that exists between monetary
depositors and banks. During normal economic circumstances, a bank
depositor may operate without interruption under the incorrect belief
that the bank holds all deposits in the form of cash reserves; for
example, she may write checks that draw upon her available balance and
expect that such checks will be honored by the bank when presented for
payment, and she may otherwise engage in ordinary banking activities
without concern for the security of her deposits. She may act as if her
deposit were a bailment. Similarly, for all practical purposes, the
warehouse depositor transacts his business with the correct
understanding that his deposit constitutes a bailment.41 However, the
default legal relationship that exists in the bank deposit context is the
antithesis of that which exists in the warehouse deposit context. When a
grain producer deposits his fungible goods with a warehouse, “the
general rule is that a bailment is created by such a deposit . . . even
though [the] grain belonging to the warehouse and various other owners
40.
41.

E.g., grain or wheat.
See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 60-02-25 (2013) (“[w]henever any grain shall be
delivered to any public warehouse . . . such delivery shall be a bailment . . . .”); and 78
AM. JUR. 2D Warehouses § 23 (2014), citing O’Keefe v. Equitable Trust Co., 103 F.2d
904 (3d Cir. 1939); In re Ellis’ Estate, 24 Del. Ch. 393, 6 A.2d 602, 612 (Del. Orph.
1939); Bonnett v. Farmers’ & Growers’ Shipping Ass’n, 105 Kan. 121, 181 P. 634,
635–36 (1919); Moses v. Teetors, 64 Kan. 149, 67 P. 526, 527 (1902); New Domain
Oil & Gas Co. v. Hayes, 259 S.W. 715, 716–17 (Ky. 1924) (recognizing rule); State v.
Cowdery, 79 Minn. 94, 81 N.W. 750, 751 (1900); State v. Colonial Club, 154 N.C. 177,
69 S.E. 771, 775 (1910); St. Anthony & Dakota Elevator Co. v. Dawson & Byfield, 20
N.D. 18, 126 N.W. 1013, 1015 (1910); Savage v. Salem Mills Co., 48 Or. 1, 85 P. 69,
74–75 (1906); Robertson v. Ramsey, 17 Tenn. App. 248, 66 S.W.2d 1022, 1035 (Ct.
App. 1933) (recognizing rule); Barnes v. Patrick, 176 Wash. 142, 28 P.2d 293, 295
(1934); and State v. Oakley, 129 Wash. 553, 225 P. 425, 427 (1924).
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is from time to time added to the common mass, and sales and deliveries
are made therefrom.”42
Under ordinary economic circumstances, the distinction between
the legal relationship and the practical relationship in the bank deposit
context is of little relevance, at least from the perspective of the
depositor. However, during extraordinary economic circumstances, the
actual legal relationship that exists is of particular importance, because
the depositor will ordinarily act as though her deposit constitutes a
bailment, whereas the bank will act as though it is a loan. During a
recession, banks suffer financial losses that bring into sharp focus the
fact that such banks used deposits to make investments and loans that
depositors did not authorize, and for which they will be liable.43 Before
discussing extraordinary economic circumstances, however, an analysis
of the similarities between a bank deposit and warehouse deposit help to
illustrate that there do not appear to be any legal or practical reasons to
classify the former as a loan and the latter as a bailment, absent express
agreement to the contrary.
For example, warehouse depositors can and do undertake
transactions using warehouse receipts that in many respects parallel
ordinary bank checking transactions. The Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”) specifically contemplates the existence of such transactions in
the warehouse deposit context: “a document of title [such as a
warehouse receipt] is negotiable if by its terms the goods are to be
delivered to bearer or to the order of a named person.”44 Similarly, the
UCC contemplates equivalent transactions in the banking context:
commercial paper, such as a certified or bank check, is a negotiable
instrument if, among other things, it is “payable to bearer or to order.”45
The analogy in this context is, of course, not to an ordinary personal
check, but to a bank or certified check; however, the emphasized
language will undoubtedly sound familiar to anybody who has handled a
personal check, and who understands that signing a blank check or
failing to identify the payee could result in losses to the drawer. Highly
42.
43.

78 AM. JUR. 2D Warehouses § 23 (2014).
Deposit insurance, as discussed in Part V, infra, only appears to mitigate these

losses.
44. U.C.C. § 7-104(a) (2012) (emphasis added). See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(16) (2012)
for the definition of “document of title,” which includes “warehouse receipt”; and
U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(42) for “warehouse receipt” defined as “a receipt issued by a person
engaged in the business of storing goods for hire.”
45. U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
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complex economic transactions occur in the financial and commodity
context. Accordingly, the need to engage in complex financial
transactions using monetary deposits is apparently not sufficient to
warrant the default loan classification in the warehouse deposit context
even though it is sufficient to warrant that conclusion in the bank deposit
context: the justification for treating deposits in the former context as
loans and in the latter context as bailments cannot be found here.
The similarities between a warehouse deposit and a bank deposit
extend to the physical characteristics of the deposited item, at least to
the extent that a warehouse deposit consists of a fungible commodity,
such as grain, wheat, fuels, or base metals. Given the fungible nature of
commodities, economies of scale result from the commingling of stored
and transported deposits of like kind—it is in the interest of the
warehouse and depositors that fungible goods be commingled for
storage or transportation purposes. Indeed, perhaps the apotheosis of
homogenous, fungible commodities exists in the energy industry. In its
purest form, natural gas is almost 100% methane. Methane is a
chemical compound of indistinguishable carbon and hydrogen particles.
This atomic homogeneity posed no problem for the Third Circuit when
it recognized the Federal Power Commission’s point that “the mere
physical commingling of [one party’s] gas in [another’s] lines . . . does
not compel rejection of historic notions of bailments . . . .”46
Similarly, the fungible nature of grain means that economies of
scale result from the commingling of stored deposits of like quality—it
is also in the interests of grain warehouses and depositors that equal
quality grain be commingled for storage purposes. Dollars are also
fungible goods; indeed, the very concept of “money” presupposes
perfect homogeneity. And, as most depositors likely understand, dollar
deposits are commingled within the bank. As above, the degree to
which deposits are fungible or commingled is not relevant for purposes
of the bailment/loan dilemma, as is sufficiently well-illustrated in the
grain deposit context, notwithstanding the apparent widespread belief
that commingling is critical to the bailment/loan determination in the
banking context.47 This point is understood by the numerous state

46. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 371 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir.
1967).
47. See, e.g., In re Nat Warren Contracting Co., 905 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1990);
Hossain v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 15 F. App’x 745, 748 (10th Cir. 2001); and
United States v. $3,000 In Cash, 906 F.Supp. 1061, 1070 (E.D. Va. 1995).
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legislatures48 that have enacted the general UCC principle that “fungible
goods [that] are commingled . . . are owned in common by the persons
entitled thereto.”49 The fact of commingling poses no practical
difficulty for the law of bailments, whether in the commodity or
monetary context, and the need for banks to commingle monetary
deposits is insufficient to warrant the default loan classification.50
Further, in the event that the amount of a particular fungible good
actually stored does not reconcile with the sum of the amount
purportedly stored as indicated by all outstanding warehouse receipts,
something untoward must have occurred—i.e., natural decay or disaster,
or something more nefarious such as conversion, embezzlement, or
fraud by the warehouse operator or its agents.51 In the first case,
depending upon the nature of the agreement apportioning the risk of loss
as between the parties, the individual grain depositors may be liable to
bear the loss pro rata;52 but, in the latter case, the warehouse operator or
somebody else would have committed a crime.53 As such, the law of
bailments is well-suited to apportion liability for loss in the
commingling context, regardless of whether such commingled items are
48. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-7-207(b) (West 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 60-02-25 (West 2013); WIS. STAT ANN. § 407.207(2) (West 2012); and MO.
ANN. STAT. § 400.7-207(2) (West 2013), among others.
49. U.C.C. § 7-207(b) (2012), among others.
50. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 248 (2012) (“In general [a] warehouse operator may
commingle agricultural products. . . . A warehouse operator shall be severally liable to
each depositor . . . to the same extent and under the same circumstances as if the
agricultural products had been stored separately.”).
51. See, e.g., Preston v. United States, 696 F.2d 528, 540 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding
that conversion is an appropriate remedy where a grain elevator wrongfully took
property owned by the plaintiff bailors).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Luther, 225 F.2d 499, 505 (10th Cir. 1955) (storage
claimants that are tenants in common are entitled to their pro rata share of the
remaining grain in storage); Dole v. Olmstead, 36 Ill. 150, 154–55 (1864) (where an
undifferentiated mass of fungible goods is totally or partially lost or destroyed, all
depositors are liable to sustain pro rata any loss which may occur by diminution or
decay).
53. See, e.g., TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 14.073(a)(1) (West 2013) (“A person
commits an offense if [he]: . . . (1) issues or aids in issuing a receipt or scale weight
ticket knowing that the grain covered by the receipt or scale weight ticket has not been
actually received at the grain warehouse.”); see also, State v. Deutsch, 77 N.J.L. 292,
298 (Sup. Ct. 1909) (stating that “[i]n order to sustain a conviction it was necessary to
prove not only that [the defendant] was a bailee of [plaintiff], and that he converted
[plaintiff’s] money to his own use, but that he did it fraudulently”).
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agricultural goods, industrial goods, or money. Here again, the fungible
nature of money and the need for banks to commingle dollars are
insufficient to warrant the default classification of ordinary monetary
deposits as loans.
The above analysis touches on the similarities between bank
deposits and the deposit of fungible goods. However, the nuances of the
legal relationship that exists between a depositor of fungible goods and a
warehouse operator, as well as the rights of third parties to whom
instruments such as warehouse receipts may have been negotiated, are
well explored and thoroughly understood by all parties involved. To be
sure, such established law simply and accurately reflects the
understanding that any reasonable party could be expected to have.
Ultimately, the commercial and economic similarities between a
deposit of dollars in a bank and a deposit of fungible commodities in a
warehouse yield the conclusion that there is no apparent legal or
practical justification for a default rule treating the former as a loan and
the latter as a bailment. In all practical regards, the nature of each
transaction is the same. Indeed, innumerable commodities have served
as “money” in many historical contexts, thus pre-empting the redherring argument that there is a meaningful difference between “money”
and such commodities that serves as a justification for the default legal
classification of dollar deposits as loans.
IV. FRACTIONAL RESERVE BANKING
Part I illustrated the confusion inherent in the 19th and early 20th
century case law that dealt with the legal status of ordinary bank
deposits. That part also demonstrated that by the 20th century, most
courts and state legislatures had settled the bailment-loan dilemma by
declaring deposits to be loans, in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary. Part II explained that such courts and legislatures reached the
conclusions set forth in Part I based upon a deficient understanding of
the legal nature of bailments. In effect, courts and legislatures
concluded that because currency deposits were commingled, they could
not legally be bailments. But, Part III demonstrated that the law of
bailments is capable of handling the legal and property issues that arise
in the context of commingled goods deposits, belying the ostensible
justifications for the juridical and legislative conclusions described in
Part II. In summary, by the early 20th century, courts and legislatures
across the nation concluded that currency deposits must be loans
because they could not legally be bailments; but, as shown above, a
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simple analysis of the law of bailments rebuts this legal conclusion.
Thus, if the conclusion obviously cannot be justified on legal grounds,
why were such courts and legislatures intent on reaching it? One way of
explaining the conclusion is to examine the realities of modern banking
both at present and in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
Generally, modern banking techniques classify deposited funds
(already, for the most part, classified as “general deposits,” i.e., loans to
the bank, as opposed to “special deposits,” i.e., bailments) as “time
deposits” or “demand deposits.” The distinction defines the legal and
contractual restrictions on depositors’ withdrawal rights. Demand
deposits, for example, impose virtually no restrictions on depositors, and
must be repaid promptly following receipt of notice of demand for
repayment.54 Time deposits, conversely, frequently include savings
accounts, certificates of deposit, and other deposits payable after a
specified period of time.55 Time deposits may be repaid more promptly
than specified by law; however, banks may postpone repayment for a
statutorily-defined (or contractually-defined) period of time. Specific,
general, demand, and time deposits encompass different legal and
practical relationships that define the respective rights and obligations of
depositors and banks in connection with deposited funds.56 But both
demand deposits and time deposits are (or, in the case of time deposits,
were) subject to fractional reserve requirements; i.e., regulations
imposed by the Federal Reserve Act in the case of nationally chartered
banks, and applicable state law in the case of all other banks, that
require banks to maintain a percentage of demand deposits and a lesser
percentage (or no percentage) of time deposits in the form of reserves.57

54. For example, in Delaware repayment must be made within thirty days. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 907(a) (West 2014). In New York, repayment must be made within
fourteen days. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 2(13) (McKinney 2014). For practical purposes,
demand deposits are usually paid immediately, although they need not be.
55. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 907(a) (2013).
56. This Article deals primarily with ordinary “demand deposits,” but the essence
of the analysis applies in any context in which a bank retains only a fraction of a type of
deposits.
57. 12 C.F.R. § 204.5(a)(1) (2013); see also, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE, DIVISION OF CONSUMER AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, Regulation D:
Reserve Requirements, in CONSUMER COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 1 & n.2 (2011),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SupManual/default.htm (“All
depository institutions, including commercial banks [and] savings banks . . . are subject
to reserve requirements. Institutions must satisfy reserve requirements by holding cash
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More specifically, modern banking techniques depend critically
upon the classification of ordinary consumer and corporate deposits as
loans, and the money supply depends critically upon these modern
banking techniques.58 Stated otherwise, modern banks are in the
business of making loans using, inter alia, money deposited by ordinary
depositors, and these loans augment the money supply. To a certain
extent, this is an oversimplification since banks can obtain the funds
they need to make loans from a variety of sources, ordinary bank
deposits among them, and the Federal Reserve also can alter the money
supply through open market operations and the federal funds rate.59 In
any event, the money supply can be expanded at a rate roughly inverse
to the portion of all deposits that are not subsequently used to make new
loans—at a rate inverse to the fractional reserve requirements imposed
by law.60 For purposes of this Article, however, the fraction of deposits
that a bank is legally required to maintain in the form of reserves is
irrelevant. Rather, the very concept of legal reserve requirements
presupposes that a certain supplementary fraction of each bank’s
deposits will not be held in reserve, and that such fraction of deposits
will be used by banks in their discretion and possibly contrary to the
intentions of a substantial portion of depositors. This process, known as
fractional reserve banking, is the de facto standard for all modern banks.
Thus, the growth of the money supply depends in part upon the
ability of banks to make loans, which, in turn, depends in no small part
on the availability of deposited funds for such purposes; and, if
deposited funds were treated as bailments, then they would be whollyunavailable to banks for lending purposes. Surely, such obvious
practical difficulties weighed heavily on courts and legislatures during
the late 19th and early 20th centuries when the default legal
classification of bank deposits began to emerge. We can presume that
in their vaults or, if vault cash is insufficient, as a balance in account at a Federal
Reserve Bank.”).
58. See generally JOSHUA N. FEINMAN, RESERVE REQUIREMENTS: HISTORY,
CURRENT PRACTICE, AND POTENTIAL REFORM
(1993),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/0693lead.pdf.
59. See generally BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 27–50 (9th ed. 2005)
[hereinafter THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS], available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf.
60. But see PAUL SHEARD, STANDARD & POOR’S ECONOMIC RESEARCH, REPEAT
AFTER ME: BANKS CANNOT AND DO NOT “LEND OUT” RESERVES 7 (2013) (arguing
that deposits are created by loans, not the other way around).
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courts and legislatures near the dawn of the 20th century were well
aware that any holding or legislation that classified ordinary bank
deposits as bailments would profoundly disrupt the banking system that
already treated them as loans.
V. RESERVE REQUIREMENTS, DEPOSIT INSURANCE, AND THE RACE TO
THE BOTTOM
Part IV argued that 19th and 20th century banking practices, both
local and national, were the actual impetus for courts and legislatures to
fashion a de jure justification for a de facto business practice. The result
was the creation of the legal framework essential to the modern
fractional reserve banking system, and, arguably, the beginning of the
end of sound money. Economic consequences aside, however, the
default legal classification of deposits as bailments had an enormous
practical consequence: it eliminated categorically the market for 100%
reserve banks and for banks that maintained any reserves substantially in
excess of legal requirements.
Minimum reserve requirements
established by applicable law do not prohibit banks from maintaining all
of their demand deposits in the form of reserves; however, as a practical
matter, no bank will maintain 100% reserves if any competing banks
operate with less than full reserves and are the beneficiaries of a deposit
insurance system subsidized by all banks. The essence of this point is
essential to the Article and thus an example is appropriate.
Suppose “Ant Bank” agrees to maintain 100% of its demand
deposits in the form of reserves, and that “Grasshopper Bank” agrees to
maintain only 50% of its demand deposits in the form of reserves; i.e.,
Grasshopper Bank is a fractional reserve bank. Suppose further that
Grasshopper Bank, in order to induce depositors to make demand
deposits, uses the half of its demand deposits not maintained as reserves
to lend, invest, or speculate, and that the interest payments, dividends,
and profits earned from such lending, investing, or speculating are used
in part to pay interest to depositors on their demand deposits. Note that,
without the opportunity to earn interest on demand deposit balances, no
rational actor would deposit funds with Grasshopper Bank as long as
Ant Bank remains a viable alternative.61 The interest payments are
61. Today, as a result of deposit insurance, Ant Bank is no longer a viable
alternative since no depositor actually bears any risk of loss (at least up to the $250,000
per account insurable limit). Ironically, deposit insurance relieves Grasshopper Bank of
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compensation to Grasshopper Bank’s depositors for their assumption of
the risk that Grasshopper Bank may fail to repay all or a portion of its
demand deposits (either as a consequence of a mismatch between
deposit withdrawal requests, on the one hand, and available cash
reserves plus liquidity from underlying loans and investments, on the
other; or, worse, a default or loss on such loans or investments).62
Assume that Ant Bank and Grasshopper Bank are identical in all other
respects.
In this simple hypothetical, some portion of depositors would
choose to deposit their funds in Ant Bank and others would choose to
deposit their funds in Grasshopper Bank. Much would depend on the
rate of interest paid by Grasshopper Bank on demand deposit balances,
and it is not unreasonable to assume that many depositors would
maintain demand deposit balances at both banks, in accordance with
each depositor’s respective appetite for savings versus investment.63
However, if we further suppose that government-sponsored deposit
“insurance” exists—insurance provided by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”)—the outcome of the above
hypothetical changes dramatically.64 If the entirety of Ant Bank’s and
Grasshopper Bank’s demand deposits are insured, and assuming that
each bank complies with the insuring entity’s reserve requirements, then
interest payments to Grasshopper Bank’s depositors constitute a
windfall, i.e., a reward without the corresponding assumption of
counterparty risk. Further, if each bank pays a “premium” to the
insuring entity in exchange for deposit “insurance,” then Ant Bank’s
depositors are subsidizing the risk-seeking behavior of Grasshopper
Bank’s depositors, assuming that each bank passes the cost of insurance

the obligation to pay interest on its deposits, at least to the extent that interest payments
compensate depositors for assuming the risk of loss.
62. Ant Bank’s depositors, conversely, are not subject to any counterparty risk
because Ant Bank is not a fractional reserve bank; i.e., there is no possibility of an
uncovered bank run, tautologically. Accordingly, Ant Bank would not have any
incentive to pay, and Ant Bank’s depositors would not have any reason to require,
interest on demand deposit balances. This comports, of course, with the theory that
interest payments partially constitute compensation for foregoing current
consumption—demand deposits can be demanded at any time, and thus do not
constitute the sacrifice of current consumption in any substantive sense.
63. By hypothesis, all of the demand deposits deposited in Ant Bank constitute
savings; whereas 50% of the demand deposits deposited in Grasshopper Bank constitute
savings, the other half constituting indirect investment.
64. See Part VI below for a discussion regarding deposit insurance.
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premiums to its respective depositors.65 In effect, the insuring entity
guarantees the demand deposit balances of both banks, but only
Grasshopper Bank pays its depositors interest on their demand deposit
balances. The obvious result is that depositors will remove their funds
from Ant Bank and deposit them in Grasshopper Bank, or that Ant Bank
will begin paying interest on its demand deposit balances, which would
require it to engage in lending, investment, or speculation (i.e., to cease
operating as a 100% reserve bank).
Additionally, because the insuring entity guarantees deposit
balances, all insured banks have an incentive to invest or lend all (or a
substantial majority of) demand deposits not legally required to be held
as reserves, irrespective of the quality of the underlying investments or
loans. In effect, every interest payment received or dividend earned by a
bank constitutes a net gain to the bank’s managers and shareholders
whether or not the underlying borrower defaults or the underlying
investment declines. A portion of such gains are passed on to depositors
in the form of interest in exchange for providing the capital (deposits)
for these loans and investments, wittingly or otherwise. The above
dynamic results in a situation in which all banks strive to maintain no
more than that fraction of demand deposits required to be held as
reserves pursuant to applicable law. The result is, in normal economic
circumstances, a race to lend or invest as quickly and haphazardly as
possible. The data bear this out, as illustrated by Figure 1. Figure 1
compares aggregate reserves actually maintained by insured depository
institutions relative to reserves required to be maintained by these
institutions pursuant to applicable laws and regulations.

65. If the cost of deposit insurance premiums is not passed on to depositors, then
Ant Bank’s managers (or shareholders) are effectively subsidizing Grasshopper Bank’s
managers (or shareholders).
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Figure 166

Four relevant conclusions follow. First, assuming the absence of
deposit insurance, all banks will operate either as 100%-reserve banks or
as fractional reserve banks. The former are in effect money warehouses
and presumably would provide ordinary banking services such as
checking and ATM access, etc., for which depositors would be assessed
a small periodic fee. Additionally, depositors would not earn interest on
their deposit balances, and would not be exposed to the possibility of
default by the bank.67 Fractional reserve banks, conversely, would pay
interest on demand deposit balances as a form of compensation for the
use of a fraction of such deposits for investment or lending purposes and
the risks associated therewith; also, they likely would provide the abovementioned ordinary banking services. Second, assuming the existence
of system-wide deposit insurance, all banks will operate as fractional
reserve banks, and the assumption that all deposit balances will yield
interest no longer obtains, since depositors do not bear the risk of loss of
their deposits. Third, absent some exogenous variable, all banks will
maintain only those reserves that they are required by law to maintain
(as evidenced by the nearly parallel lines in Figure 1).68 Fourth,
fractional reserve banking implies the bank-as-debtor and depositor-as66. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Aggregate Reserves of
Depository
Institutions
and
the
Monetary
Base,
available
at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/default.htm, (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
67. Assuming the bank was operating lawfully; i.e., actually maintaining 100% of
its deposits in the form of reserves (or, more to the point, acting as a lawful bailee).
68. Data from 2008 through the present show a dramatic increase in actual reserves
relative to required reserves (not depicted in Figure 1). The discrepancy is the result of
various economic stimulus programs designed to increase bank assets coupled with the
resulting reluctance of such banks to increase lending, the original intent of such
economic stimulus programs notwithstanding. See supra Figure 1.
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creditor relationship; whereas 100% reserve banking implies that
depositors are bailors and banks are bailees of deposits.
With these conclusions in mind, note that the hypothesis that
depositors will patronize fractional reserve banks only if they are
compensated for the risk of loss69 presupposes that the there is an
alternative—that 100% reserve banks will not lend or invest any portion
of their deposit balances, as would be expected in a bailor-bailee
relationship. This is the logical equivalent of supposing that there exists
a realistic option to bank pursuant to a debtor-creditor relationship or
pursuant to a bailor-bailee relationship. But, in today’s economy,
bailor-bailee banking relationships and 100% reserve banks do not
exist.70 This comports with the explanation that deposit insurance
excludes 100% reserve banks from the market. In effect, why not enter
into a debtor-creditor relationship if the government guarantees the
debt? Thus, the default legal classification of ordinary deposits as loans
instead of bailments established the legal framework for the modern
fractional reserve banking system. Subsequently, the creation of
systematic deposit insurance drove 100% reserve banks from the
market.
VI. SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
To summarize, the default legal classification of ordinary bank
deposits as loans, as described in Part I, was based on the erroneous
legal conclusion that commingled bank deposits could not be bailments,
as described in Part II. Part III debunked this erroneous legal
conclusion; and Part IV illustrated that prevailing banking practices in
the 19th and 20th centuries were the actual impetus for courts and
legislatures to fashion the default legal classification. A primary
consequence of this legal framework was the rapid expansion of
fractional reserve banking together with the development of systematic
deposit insurance, as detailed in Part V. Thus, the legal classification of
ordinary bank deposits as loans instead of bailments resulted in the
universal expansion of fractional reserve banking together with its

69.
70.

I.e., only if their deposit balances earn interest.
Depositing money in a safe deposit box would be a clear example of a bailment
between a depositor and a bank, but this relationship does not share any of the
characteristics of banking, per se.
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crucial governmental support, deposit insurance. This Part discusses
several possible consequences of these developments
Specifically, several adverse social, political, and economic
consequences are reasonably attributable to the misclassification of
ordinary demand deposits as loans instead of bailments. These
consequences include: (i) the mischaracterization of deposit guarantees
as “insurance” instead of transfer payments; (ii) bank runs that, but-for
fractional reserve banking, could not occur; (iii) suboptimal lending and
investment through surreptitious social policy masquerading as private
enterprise; (iv) moral hazard and subsidization of risky lending and
investment; and (v) the devaluation of money through inflation.
A. DEPOSIT GUARANTEES: INSURANCE OR TRANSFER PAYMENTS?
The true legal nature of the depositor-bank relationship is of critical
importance in the event of bank insolvency. Under such circumstances,
depositors are confronted with the startling reality that, as unintended
creditors of the bank, the law places the full risk of loss on them. In this
context, as in many normal debtor-creditor relationships, depositors may
be forced to bear the full cost of investment failure by their respective
banks; i.e., they bear the risk of default. The extent of depositors’
participation in the realized gains of the bank takes the form of interest
payments on deposits, which if paid at all, are only loosely correlated
with the performance of the bank’s underlying loan and investment
portfolio and the bank’s risk of default.71 Viewed in this light, the risk
and cost of insolvency of a particular bank might be justified in the case
of an informed depositor in light of the countervailing interest earned on
her deposit; but it is not clear how to justify subjecting an ordinary
depositor to the risk of financial loss if such depositor is not even aware
that she is a creditor.72 This helps to explain the creation of federal
deposit insurance, which arose as a direct consequence of the anomalous
legal classification of an ordinary demand deposit as a loan.
In order to perpetuate the widespread but inaccurate belief that
depositors retain title to deposited funds, such funds must be available
for withdrawal on demand. When such funds are not available for
immediate withdrawal, the FDIC steps in as a receiver for the bank,
71. See JOHN H. MALKIN, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
RESEARCH:
WHAT DETERMINES INTEREST RATES (2005), available at
http://www.aei.org/files/2005/01/01/20041222_17755graphics.pdf.
72. Even ignoring the existence of deposit insurance.
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liquidates its assets, and returns deposited funds to depositors.
However, the history of the FDIC illustrates that too frequently its assets
are insufficient to bail out insured institutions. This fact—that the
cumulative total of premiums paid by functional banks is frequently
insufficient to cover insured deposits of failed banks (particularly during
a recession)—is a reflection of an underlying possibility: bank losses
that accrue as a result of loans or investments made on misclassified
deposits may be caused by such legal misclassification and, as such, are
not insurable events. Figure 2, infra, depicts historical FDIC asset
balances (reserve fund amounts available to cover insured deposit
losses) as a percent of corresponding aggregate insured deposits.
Figure 273

The shortfalls in 1991 and again between 2008 and 2010 suggest
that losses on loans and investments made using misclassified deposits
are not insurable events.74 Alarmingly, negative values represent
periods during which the FDIC lacked sufficient assets to cover actual
losses on insured deposits. Thus, then-FDIC Chairwoman Sheila Bair’s
statement, in a November 17, 2009 press release, that “[t]he FDIC was
created specifically for times like these. Our resources are strong,”75 is
73. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT 2012, 114
(2013), available at http://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report/2012annualreport/
AR12final.pdf.
74. Id. Since 2008, the FDIC has fallen well short of its designated reserve ratios
of 1.25% through 2010 and 2% thereafter. Deposit Insurance Management Fund,
FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/fund.html (last updated June 17, 2013).
75. Press release, FDIC, No Safer Place for Your Money: Why the FDIC’s
Resources Are Strong and Insured Deposits Are “Absolutely Safe” (Nov. 17, 2009),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09210.html [hereinafter No
Safer Place for Your Money].
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difficult to reconcile with the FDIC’s almost $21 billion deficit at the
end of 2009.76 Of course, to perpetuate the conflict between depositors’
unconditional demand for immediate access to deposited funds and the
default legal classification that such deposits are loans, depositors
cannot be required to bear the consequences of such insurance fund
deficiencies.77 Along those lines, then-Chairwoman Bair in the same
press release stated that the “FDIC fully guarantees [depositors’] insured
deposits and provides them with seamless access to their money. For
the insured depositor, a bank failure is a non-event.”78
However, with banks continuing to fail and the FDIC suffering
substantial deficits, the FDIC had no choice but to replenish its reserve
fund to ensure that such bank failures would actually be “non-events”
for depositors. Supporting the conclusion that deposit insurance is not
actually insurance, the FDIC amended “its assessment regulations to
require insured [banks] to prepay” regular risk-based assessments three
years in advance, effective as of December 30, 2009.79 At the time, the
FDIC expected that its mandatory prepayment program would add $45
billion to its reserve fund.80 For purposes of this Article, however, the
relevant consideration is whether an economic transaction that requires
the prepayment of future premiums in order to compensate for past
losses (as distinguished from current premiums to cover expected future
losses) properly can be classified as insurance.81 It cannot.82 At the risk
76. FDIC, STATISTICS AT A GLANCE: HISTORICAL TRENDS (2013), available at
www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/stats/2013jun/fdic.pdf.
77. As should be obvious, the reason this situation is a conflict is because creditors
cannot require the repayment of a loan “on demand.” By definition, an economic
transaction in which a creditor can demand the return of “credited” goods immediately
is a bailment, not a loan. This point is not harmed by conditions within a borrower’s
ostensible control (or at least outside of creditors’ control) the occurrence of which may
require the immediate repayment of credited funds, such as the failure to make periodic
payments or to reach certain milestones (as in the construction lending industry).
78. See No Safer Place for Your Money, supra note 75.
79. 12 C.F.R. § 327.12 (2013).
80. Press release, FDIC, FDIC Board Approves Final Rule on Prepaid Assessments
(Nov. 12, 2009), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09203.html
(last visited Nov. 5, 2013). Approximately $46 billion ultimately was paid.
Memorandum from Arthur J. Murton (Director of Division of Insurance and Research)
to FDIC Board of Directors, 2 (June 8, 2010), available at
www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/memo3.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
81. The FDIC apparently viewed mandatory “prepayment [as] preferable to
borrowing from [the] Treasury,” which “could risk diminishing public confidence in the
FDIC and in insured [banks].” FDIC, 12 C.F.R. PART 327: PREPAID ASSESSMENTS 20
(2009), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/board/2009nov12no4.pdf (last visited
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of belaboring the point, the fact that FDIC assets are frequently
insufficient to cover bank losses is likely not a failure of actuarial
calculations. The FDIC’s actuaries, much to their credit, try futilely to
calculate insurance premiums for seemingly uninsurable events: losses
that may be caused proximately by the legal misclassification of
ordinary deposits as loans instead of bailments.83
All of this illustrates the critical role played by deposit insurance in
maintaining the illusion that a deposit is a loan and simultaneously a
bailment, an illusion that the law resolves unequivocally in favor of
banks—an ordinary deposit is a loan, absent agreement to the contrary.84
However, in order to preserve the quantity of deposited funds available
to banks for lending and investment, depositors must believe they
always have access to deposited funds on demand. If depositors
assumed the risk of loss (if they might not have access to deposited
funds on demand), they would not deposit their funds in fractional
reserve banks, or else, as explained above, would demand substantially
higher interest payments to compensate for their assumption of the risk
of loss (i.e., to compensate them for the risk of the real economic
transaction into which they enter—lending).
Deposit insurance
perpetuates this illusion by providing depositors with access to their
funds even though such depositors’ banks have lost the deposited funds
via bad loans or investments.
B. BANK RUNS, DEPOSIT INSURANCE, AND CIRCULAR REASONING
If case law (and statutory law) paralleled the understanding held by
ordinary depositors regarding the status of their ordinary deposits, bank
runs could not occur and, as a consequence, deposit insurance would

Nov. 5, 2013). It’s not clear to this author how the FDIC’s decision to require its
regulated counterparts to pre-pay arbitrary fees in order to balance the FDIC’s books is
more or less dubious—from a public confidence perspective—than borrowing the same
amount from the Treasury. Id.
82. See infra Part VI.
83. “The FDIC has already increased annual assessment rates uniformly by 3 basis
points beginning in 2011, based on the FDIC’s long term projections for the DIF and
liquidity needs and to ensure that the fund reserve ratio returns to 1.15 percent within
the statutorily mandated eight years.” FDIC, 12 C.F.R. PART 327: PREPAID
ASSESSMENTS, 24 (Nov. 12, 2009), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/board/
2009nov12no4.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
84. Thompson v. Riggs, 72 U.S. 663, 678 (1866).
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serve no purpose. If banks properly classified deposits according to the
intentions of their depositors, then each deposit would consist of two
explicit components: special deposits and the complementary portion
consisting of general deposits. The sum of the amount classified as
special deposits plus the sum of the amount classified as general
deposits would, by definition, equal 100% of the amounts deposited.
Under this system, by classifying a deposit as a general deposit available
to the bank for subsequent lending, the purchase of securities, or
otherwise (and not as a special deposit to be stored securely as a
bailment), the depositor would necessarily understand that such deposit
is exposed to possible losses.85 By implication, the depositor’s
intentions with respect to the remainder of the deposit (i.e., the amount
classified as a special deposit) would be honored. To be sure, the
fraction of special deposits “matched” by reserves would always be
100%.86 The essential point is that the depositor would make the
distinction as to the fraction of the deposit that is “savings” (and, thus, to
be entrusted to the bank’s vault) and the fraction of the deposit that is
not “savings” (and which may be loaned or invested by the bank or
otherwise used in the bank’s discretion).
Accordingly, the very reason for deposit insurance (the
establishment of a pool of assets funded by premiums87 paid by banks
and available to compensate depositors in the event of a bank run)
would be eliminated. There could not be any bank runs, at least not any
for which the bank did not have adequate corresponding reserves on
hand. The proposition is quite simple: if courts enforce the property
rights and contractual rights of depositors as commonly understood by
depositors, uncovered bank runs would be eliminated and there would

85. This Article assumes that a substantial portion of depositors, if given the
opportunity to classify their deposits as bailments or loans, would understand that loans
could be subject to financial losses. However, it is no counterargument that some
depositors might not understand that the fraction of their deposits classified as loans
would be subject to possible financial losses. To the extent that counterargument is
true, it applies equally to the widespread public sale of debt or equity securities
generally. One could imagine the development of a plethora of investment products
designed to cater to the various risk and investing styles of the bank’s customers –
perhaps something akin to modern bonds and/or mortgage-backed securities.
86. If the bank did not have 100% of its “savings deposits” in the form of reserves
then something untoward must have occurred, i.e., theft in one or more myriad forms,
or destruction such as by fire or natural disaster.
87. As discussed throughout this Article, it is telling that the reserves in deposit
insurance fund are frequently insufficient to cover losses during economic recessions.
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be no need for deposit insurance.88 Indeed, if banks treated the deposits
entrusted to them by their clients in accordance with their clients’
intentions (as bailments), an awkward conversation would ensue if a
bank tried to insure its deposits against embezzlement or conversion by
bank officials.89
C. ARTIFICIAL CREDIT CREATION AND SUBOPTIMAL INVESTMENT AND
LENDING
As explained in Part II, the default legal classification of a bank
deposit as a loan results in a transfer of title from the depositor to the
bank. With this transfer of title comes the normal legal accoutrements,
in particular the right of the bank to use deposited funds at its discretion.
Invariably, since banks, like all businesses, are interested in turning a
profit, each bank faces a nearly irresistible temptation to exercise such
discretion and use its deposited funds to make loans to third parties,90
purchase investments, or otherwise engage in speculative business
activities. This is the fractional reserve banking process, and it
contributes to the artificial expansion of the nation’s available credit.
But increasing the nation’s money supply through credit creation
fostered by the fractional reserve banking process is not merely a
curious consequence of the debtor-creditor banking relationship that is
the subject of this Article: increasing the nation’s money supply through
this artificial credit creation process is the purpose and the most
important consequence of the fractional reserve system.91 The problem,
88. To clarify, this Article takes the position that banks are likely aware that most
of their depositors have little understanding of the banking process in general, and that,
specifically, such depositors do not understand that their deposits will be loaned or
invested by banks. This raises interesting questions about the origin of legislation
codifying the opposite of common, public understanding. However, whether depositors
know that their deposits may be used by banks for lending and investment is irrelevant.
89. This assessment does not apply to forms of insurance designed to mitigate
losses in connection with third party actions or “natural” losses; e.g., a smoothly
operating marketplace might involve the sale of fire-protection insurance to banks, the
cost of which might be passed on to the bank’s depositors.
90. The bank profits by charging a rate of interest on its loans that exceeds the rate
of interest its pays, if any, with respect to funds in its deposit account.
91. PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE MORAL HAZARD IMPLICATIONS OF DEPOSIT
INSURANCE:
THEORY AND EVIDENCE, 4, 5 (2007), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2006/mfl/pam.pdf (“The unstable balance
sheet of banks is not a quirk. Rather, it is inherent to a key economic function of banks,
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however, is that the only inherent restriction on prudent lending and
investment that exists in the bailment context is entirely absent in the
fractional reserve context. That restriction (the classification of an
ordinary deposit as a bailment) would require each bank to handle
deposits according to the intentions of depositors. Having been relieved
of such responsibility, there is nothing inherent in the current legal
relationship between a bank and its depositors that serves to encourage
prudent lending and investment. This void helps to explain the dizzying
array of federal and state banking regulations, each of which presumably
is intended to induce prudent banking and lending activities—prudence
that would exist if ordinary deposits were classified as bailments, not
loans.92
Accordingly, regulators are forced to contend with and preempt the
harmful consequences of a banking process that would not give rise to
such consequences if ordinary deposits were classified in accordance
with depositors’ intentions. Such regulations include, generally,
complex and burdensome restrictions on entry, “activity restrictions,
prophylactic rules, examinations, and sanctions”93 and, more
specifically, “monitoring by state and federal regulators . . . [and]
regulatory devices such as lending limits, minimum capital
requirements, restrictions on insider dealings, and restrictions on
competition among firms.”94 An example of such regulations include
seemingly prudent restrictions on investment contained in applicable
bank regulations, typified by the following: “the business of dealing in
securities and stock by [banks] shall be limited to purchasing and selling
such securities and stock . . . [for] customers, and in no case for its own
account.” 95 But even this seemingly-salutary attempt to induce prudent

which is providing financial liquidity. As financial intermediaries, banks accept liquid
deposits from the public and reinvest those funds in long-term, illiquid loans . . . .
Banks have confidence that they can actually honor depositors’ demands based on the
principle of fractional reserves.”).
92. Perhaps this issue will be the topic of another Article; however, I don’t hesitate
to observe that such myriad regulations seem to cause many more problems than they
resolve.
93. MCCOY, supra note 91, at 10 (arguing that deposit insurance is not really
insurance because it does not guard against a defined, preventable loss).
94. Jonathan R. Macey & Elizabeth H. Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors:
A Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical Arguments, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 215, 220
(1998) [hereinafter Macey & Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors].
95. 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (2012).
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lending and investment is obviated by exceptions in the very same
paragraph:
The limitations . . . contained [in this section] . . . shall not apply to
obligations of the United States, or general obligations of any State
or of any political subdivision thereof, . . . instruments of or issued
by the Federal National Mortgage Association, or the Government
National Mortgage Association, or mortgages, obligations or other
securities which are or ever have been sold by the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation pursuant to Section 305 or Section 306
of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act . . . [or]
securities that . . . are offered and sold pursuant to section 4(5) of the
96
97
Securities Act of 1933 . . . or . . . mortgage related securities.

Permitting banks to purchase the debt of government-sponsored
enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is an exception that
swallows a rule designed ostensibly to reduce risk.
In addition, notwithstanding the restrictions on investment and
lending codified in applicable banking regulations,98 policymakers
enacted exemptions for loans collateralized by real estate, including
residential mortgage backed securities: “[a]ny national [bank] may
make, arrange, purchase or sell loans or extensions of credit secured by .
. . real estate.”99 This particular exemption has obvious consequences
for government-sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. These entities, by alleviating much of the risk borne by banks
with respect to their loan portfolios, contributed to the drastic increase in
suboptimal lending and inevitable residential mortgage foreclosures that
defined the recent financial crisis.100 Moreover, the economic harm
caused by such government-sponsored enterprises magnifies the
underlying harm caused by the legal misclassification of ordinary bank
96. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 4(5), 48 Stat. 74 (“transactions involving offers or
sales of one or more promissory notes directly secured by a first lien on a single parcel
of real estate upon which is located a dwelling or other residential or commercial
structure”).
97. 12 U.S.C. § 24. “Mortgage related securities” are defined in 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(41) (2012).
98. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24.
99. 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2012).
100. See generally PETER J. WALLISON, DISSENT FROM THE MAJORITY REPORT OF
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION (2011) [hereinafter DISSENT FROM THE
MAJORITY REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION], available at
www.aei.org/files/2011/01/26/Wallisondissent.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
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deposits as loans instead of bailments. As discussed above, the
misclassification of ordinary bank deposits coupled with system-wide
deposit insurance fosters a nearly irresistible incentive to engage in
speculative lending and investment activities. That incentive is
enhanced by loan guarantees provided by government-sponsored
enterprises. As a result, few forces remain to impede the rapid
expansion of credit, in part because credit expansion is the primary
purpose of fractional reserve banking.
More general political justifications for expanding the money
supply through artificial credit creation are included in explicit federal
regulations: “national [banks] . . . shall have power . . . to make
investments directly or indirectly . . . to promote the public welfare,
including the welfare of low- and moderate-income communities or
families (such as by providing housing, services, or jobs).”101 Surely,
such mandates played some role in the recent economic turmoil and
government fiscal profligacy. However, a bigger problem is embodied
in the premise that greater access to artificial credit will “promote the
public welfare.” Although not within the scope of this Article, the
economics of this proposition are dubious at best. Nevertheless, from
the proposition that courts should enforce depositors’ property rights
and contractual rights (by classifying deposits according to depositors’
intentions), it does not follow that lending by banks would grind to a
halt,102 or that no fraction of a bank’s deposits would be available for
lending.
Indeed, the primary direct consequence of enforcing
depositors’ rights would be the elimination of the discrepancy between
the banks’ understanding and the depositors’ understanding of which
deposits are available for lending or investment. This, of course, would
mean that depositors and not bankers would be the ultimate
determinants of the amount of lending and investment undertaken by the
society as a whole.103
The allocation of responsibility between depositors, banks, or other
third parties with respect to the type of lending and investment cannot be
logically predicted using this framework. It is reasonable to assume, as
is already the case, that ordinary people would voluntarily abdicate at
least a portion of such responsibility to trained investment professionals.
101.
102.

12 U.S.C. § 24.
It is likely the case, however, that the real amount of lending could be expected
to decline, ceteris paribus.
103. Savings and investment are only identical as the percent of reserves maintained
by fractional reserve banks approaches zero.
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To be sure, the financial industry (and banks themselves) would have an
interest in providing investment management services to depositors. In
any event, the legal misclassification of ordinary demand deposits as
loans instead of bailments likely results in substantially more lending, as
well as a different allocation of capital between types of loans and
investments, than would otherwise occur.
D. SURREPTITIOUS SOCIAL POLICY
The temptation to policymakers to play social engineer is nearly
irresistible, more so when the economic consequences of such
engineering are not obvious. For example, prior to the 2008 financial
crisis, the Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”) “continue[d] to
encourage [banks] to extend conventional prime lending to historically
underserved segments of the market.”104 The CRA “encouraged” this
economically-unsound behavior by utilizing the relevant enforcement
provisions which, inter alia, permit federal regulators to “withhold
approvals for such transactions as mergers and acquisitions and branch
network expansion if [an] applying bank [does] not have a satisfactory
CRA rating.”105 During the twenty-five years prior to the financial
crisis, the CRA effectively forced banks to make loans to high-risk
borrowers. Setting aside the intentions behind, and consequences of,106
this social policy, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that such risky
lending would be possible at all without the legal misclassification of
ordinary bank deposits as loans. In effect, through legislation like the
CRA, Congress induces banks to make loans they would not otherwise
make using money that does not belong to them. Why not simply
require ordinary people to make loans directly to high-risk borrowers?
Presumably, the political costs of such a direct approach would be less
than salutary. A healthy and well-functioning polity depends in part
upon legislating social policy in a transparent manner. In this regard,
the misclassification of ordinary demand deposits contributes to the
104. William C. Apgar & Mark Duda, The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the
Community Reinvestment Act:
Past Accomplishments & Future Regulatory
Challenges, 9(2) FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.: ECON. POL’Y REV. 169, 175 (2003),
available at www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/03v09n2/0306apga.pdf (last visited
Nov. 5, 2013).
105. See DISSENT FROM THE MAJORITY REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
COMMISSION, supra note 100, at 85.
106. See id. at 85–92.
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corruption of the polity by facilitating the passage furtively of legislation
that might not otherwise survive the democratic process.
E. MORAL HAZARD AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM INSTABILITY
Modern banks make loans and investments using deposited funds
that are classified improperly as loans instead of bailments. The
depositors of these funds do not intend to lend or invest them (directly,
or indirectly through bank intermediation) and, by implication, do not
intend to expose them to the risk of loss. Further, such depositors
historically had an incentive to pay close attention to the financial
integrity of the banks into which they deposited their funds. They had
an incentive to monitor the activities of such banks and to respond by
withdrawing their deposited funds in the event of financial instability.
Such monitoring led to bank runs upon the appearance, real or
otherwise, of financial instability.107 However, the creation of federal
deposit insurance obviated the need for depositors to monitor the
financial integrity of their respective banks by seeming to eliminate the
consequences to depositors of poor investment and lending by banks. In
this regard, deposit insurance transfers the risk of loss from the
depositors to the shareholders of other banks (to the extent that they too
contribute to the insurance fund) or to the monetary unit generally (to
the extent that its value is diluted through the issuance of new monetary
units to “cover” loan and investment losses). The transfer of this risk is
the quintessential “moral hazard problem of deposit insurance.”108 In
other words, deposit insurance induces the same risky investment and
lending that it is designed to insure against—it reduces the motive to
prevent loss.109
Of course, the problem of moral hazard in the general insurance
context is well understood110—a random insurable event is more likely
107. See Wally Suphap, Toward Effective Risk-Adjusted Bank Deposit Insurance: A
Transnational Strategy, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 829, 840–41 (1990) [hereinafter
Suphap, Toward Effective Risk-Adjusted Bank Deposit Insurance].
108. Deposit Insurance Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affair,
108th Cong. 2 (2003) (statement of Alan Greenspan, former Chairman, Federal Reserve
Board), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2003/
20030226/.
109. Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q. J. ECON. 541, 541
(1979).
110. See generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV.
237 (1996).
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to occur after insurance against the underlying event is obtained.111 The
general moral hazard analysis quickly leads to the banal observation that
insured banks have an incentive to partake in speculative lending and
investment activities because they do not bear all of the associated
risks.112 But the problem of moral hazard in the deposit insurance
context is worse than in the ordinary insurance context for at least three
reasons. For example, first, in the years leading up to the 2008 financial
crisis, bank loans generated substantial profits to subprime lenders ab
initio (through the prompt package and sale of these loans into pooled
investment vehicles called mortgage-backed securities), thereby
rewarding banks that were able to process large quantities of
transactions without regard to quality.113 Second, the costs of deposit
insurance are not adjusted to reflect the actual risk of the investment and
lending activity of a given bank.114 As such, each bank “has an
incentive to make risky loans that it would not make but for insurance.

111.

See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, RISK, INCENTIVES AND INSURANCE: THE PURE THEORY
30 (1983), available at https://www.genevaassociation.org/
media/220469/GA1983_GP8(26)_Stiglitz.pdf (arguing that “the shift in the primary
locus of . . . insurance . . . to the State, has undoubtedly been accompanied by an
increase in the distortions and inefficiencies associated from what we have called the
moral hazard problem”).
112. See J. Huston McCulloch, Bank Regulation and Deposit Insurance, 59 J. BUS.
79, 82 (1986) (arguing “[l]argely as a consequence of the federal deposit insurance
umbrella, banks and thrifts have engaged with impunity in all manner of excessive
risks”).
113. See DISSENT FROM THE MAJORITY REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
COMMISSION, supra note 100, at 54–55 (explaining that subprime loans were sold
through “Wall Street underwriters to Fannie and Freddie, which became the largest
buyers of these high-risk PMBS between 2002 and 2005”).
114. See Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache, Does Deposit Insurance
Increase Banking System Stability?, 49 J. MONETARY ECON. 1373 (2002); see also,
Viral V. Acharya, João A. C. Santos, & Tanju Yorulmazer, Systemic Risk & Deposit
Insurance Premiums, 16 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.: ECON. POL’Y REV. 89 (2010),
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/10v16n1/1008yoru.pdf (last
visited Nov. 16, 2013); Suphap, Toward Effective Risk-Adjusted Bank Deposit
Insurance, supra note 107, at 838 (pointing out that “the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 explicitly required the [FDIC] to adopt a riskbased assessment system . . . [but] . . . the FDIC’s current authority to charge riskadjusted premiums has been heavily curtailed by the Deposit Insurance Funds Act of
1996 . . . . As a result . . . over 90 percent of depositary institutions operating in the
United States have avoided paying risk-adjusted premiums.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
OF MORAL HAZARD
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Therefore, when the price of insurance is fixed, increasing the riskiness
of the loan portfolio redounds primarily to the benefit of the residual
claimants—bank stockholders.”115 Third, the fact that the deposit
insurance scheme is run by government, as opposed to private
companies, contributes to financial system instability by virtually
eliminating the incentive for bank shareholders or depositors to monitor
investment and lending activity.116
These three points suggest that deposit insurance is not insurance at
all, but, rather a framework for moral hazard and financial instability
through an explicit “guarant[ee] against loss,”117 because insured banks
“can borrow at or below the risk-free rate by issuing insured deposits
and then invest[] the proceeds in risky assets with higher expected
yields” without concern for potential loss.118 This means that the
conclusion that “[d]eposit insurance creates moral hazard problems that
can be mitigated only by regulations” completely misses the point:119
deposit insurance facilitates the moral hazard that is caused by the legal
misclassification of ordinary demand deposits, which, itself, is a form of
regulation. It is a strange thing to conclude that further regulation is an
appropriate remedy to a problem that exists only because of the
prevailing regulatory structure. In practice, the process of “insuring”
deposits is essential to maintain the illusion that deposits are
simultaneously bailments and loans, and thus available for withdrawal
by depositors and for lending or investment by banks. Without deposit
insurance, depositors would ensure that their deposits were legally
classified as bailments, not loans, or else would insist upon interest
115. Macey & Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors, supra note 94, at 218–19
(quoting Fischel, Rosenfield, & Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding
Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 314 (1987) (internal ellipses removed)).
116. See Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking
System Stability?, supra note 114 (“[T]he adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank
stability tends to be stronger the more extensive is the coverage offered to depositors,
where the scheme is funded, and where the scheme is run by the government rather
than by the private sector.”) (emphasis added).
117. MCCOY, supra note 91, at 10 (arguing that deposit insurance is not really
insurance because it does not guard against a defined, preventable loss).
118. Suphap, Toward Effective Risk-Adjusted Bank Deposit Insurance, supra note
107, at n.62 (quoting Michael C. Keeley, Deposit Insurance, Risk & Market Power in
Banking, 80 AMER. ECON. REV. 1183, 1183 (1990)).
119. V. V. Chari, Banking Without Deposit Insurance or Bank Panics: Lessons
from a Model of the U.S. National Banking System, 13(3) FED. RESERVE BANK OF
MINNEAPOLIS
QUARTERLY
REV.
3,
17
(1989),
available
at
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/qr/qr1331.pdf.
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payments to compensate for the risk of loss. Moral hazard would not
exist in this context, and systemic financial instability would be
somewhat less, if ordinary bank deposits were classified as bailments
instead of loans.
F. DILUTION OF THE VALUE OF MONEY BY DEPOSIT INSURANCE PAYOUTS
Moral hazard is not the end of the problem, however. As stated
above, banks are able to distribute the risks of loss to other banks, their
shareholders, and depositors. But, they are able also to distribute the
risk of loss to the monetary unit generally. During times of severe
economic crisis, dilution of the monetary unit serves as the primary
means employed by the FDIC to meet its guarantee obligations. When
the FDIC’s reserve fund is insufficient to meet its payout obligations,
the FDIC has few options but to require participating insured institutions
to pre-pay certain assessments,120 or to borrow from the United States
Treasury.121 As a practical matter, the source of the funds delivered to
the FDIC may be the same in either case. For example, during the
financial crisis, the FDIC elected to require participating insured
institutions to prepay about $46 billion in assessments, as discussed
above.122 At the same time, the excess reserves of such participating
institutions reached historic levels.123 Reserves, of course, are generated
when the Federal Reserve purchases securities from insured financial

120.
121.

12 C.F.R. § 327.12 (2013).
12 U.S.C. § 1824(a) (2012) (“The [FDIC] is authorized to borrow from the
Treasury . . . for insurance purposes [an amount] not exceeding in the aggregate
$100,000,000,000.”). Tellingly, at the height of the financial crisis, Congress
authorized the FDIC to borrow through 2010 up to $500,000,000,000 as determined to
be necessary by the FDIC’s Board of Directors. 12 U.S.C. § 1824(a)(3)(A).
122. Press release, FDIC, FDIC Board Approves Final Rule on Prepaid Assessments
(Nov. 12, 2009), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09203.html
(last visited Nov. 5, 2013). Approximately $46 billion ultimately was paid.
Memorandum from Arthur J. Murton (Director of Division of Insurance and Research)
to FDIC Board of Directors, 2 (June 8, 2010), available at
www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/memo3.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
123. Press release, Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve, Monetary Policy in the Crisis: Past, Present, & Future (Jan. 3, 2010),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20100103a.htm.
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institutions, giving them cash in exchange.124 In the event that such
financial institutions decline to use such reserves to make new loans or
purchase other investments, the reserves become “excess reserves.” In
December, 2009, when the FDIC required insured financial institutions
to prepay $45 billion in assessments, these financial institutions had
stored nearly $1.06 trillion in excess reserves—all of it created by the
Federal Reserve.125
Alternatively, the FDIC could have exercised its legal authority to
borrow from the Treasury. If the FDIC had elected to do so, the
Treasury would have had two options to generate the funds for the
requisite loan. First, the Treasury could have raised tax revenues.
Second, the Treasury could have issued new debt. If the Treasury were
to issue new debt, it would need willing buyers of that debt. Today, the
primary willing buyer is the Federal Reserve,126 which owns now a
record $2.2 trillion in Treasury securities127—the Federal Reserve
created $2.2 trillion dollars in order to purchase Treasury Securities on
the secondary market, and diluted the value of all pre-existing dollars in
the process. If the FDIC had borrowed from the Treasury (instead of
imposing a special assessment), the Treasury would have funded that
124. See, e.g., Bob McTeer, Bank Reserves: A Hot Potato, FORBES ONLINE (May
22, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bobmcteer/2013/05/22/bank-reservesa-hot-potato/.
125. Aggregate Reserves of Depository Institutions and the Monetary Base, FED.
RESERVE (Dec. 31, 2009, 4:30 PM), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/h3/20091231/.
126. Technically, the Federal Reserve Act prohibits the Federal Reserve from
purchasing Treasury securities directly from the Treasury. 12 U.S.C. § 355(2) (2012)
(“Every Federal reserve bank shall have power . . . to buy and sell in the open market,
under the direction and regulations of the Federal Open Market Committee, any
obligation which is a direct obligation of, or fully guaranteed as to principal and interest
by, any agency of the United States.”). Rather, the Federal Reserve must purchase such
securities on the secondary market. In practice, this limitation has no effect since
primary market purchasers now purchase Treasury securities with an eye towards
selling them immediately to the Federal Reserve. See, e.g., Karen Brettell, Treasuries –
Despite Weak 5-Year Note Sale, Prices End Higher, REUTERS (June 26, 2013, 3:15 PM)
(reporting that sales of Treasuries slumped drastically after the Federal Reserve
announced plans, later retracted, to reduce its future purchases), available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/26/markets-usa-bondsidUSL2N0F21IN20130626.
127. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, U.S. Treasury Securities Held by the
Federal
Reserve:
All
Maturities
(TREAST),
available
at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TREAST?cid=32218 (last visited Nov. 11,
2013).
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loan by issuing debt in the form of Treasury Securities; primary market
purchasers would have purchased those Treasury Securities aware that
that they could quickly sell them to the Federal Reserve; and, the
Federal Reserve, in turn, would have purchased them on the secondary
market using newly-created money. In either case, the FDIC would
have funded insured deposits using money created ex nihilo.
To summarize, deposit insurance funds exist in part to compensate
depositors against the risk of lending and investment losses that they do
not intend to assume. If those losses are realized, the deposit insurance
payments theoretically can be made in real or in nominal dollar terms.
If this is a guarantee of a real value, the amount that can be
guaranteed is constrained: the government must impose real taxes to
honor a deposit guarantee. If the deposit guarantee is nominal, the tax is
the (inflation) tax on nominal assets caused by money creation. Such
taxation occurs even if no inflation results; in any case, the price level is
higher than it would have been otherwise, so some nominally
denominated wealth is appropriated.128
Put differently, bank loan or investment losses that result in
insufficient liquidity to satisfy withdrawal requests necessarily require a
guarantee to depositors from the insuring entity that is either nominally
or really equal to the amount of the lost deposits. Since the modern
fractional reserve banking system is a primary consequence of the legal
misclassification of ordinary bank deposits as loans instead of bailments,
and since the expansion of the money supply is a primary consequence
of the fractional reserve banking system, there is little reason to believe
that any deposit insurance payout will be made in real, as opposed to
nominal, terms.
G. DILUTION OF THE VALUE OF MONEY FROM LOANS AND INVESTMENTS
MADE POSSIBLE BY DEPOSIT INSURANCE
As described in Part V, deposit insurance is a critical component of
any banking system built upon fractional reserves because it transfers
the risk of loss from depositors individually to the economic and
monetary systems generally, thereby creating the environment requisite
for fractional reserve banking. Thereafter, deposit insurance obviated
128. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, &
Liquidity, 24(1) FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS QUARTERLY REV. 14, 20 (2000),
available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/qr/qr2412.pdf.
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the market’s demand for 100% reserve banks by rendering their services
superfluous. What remains is the modern banking system, pursuant to
which monetary deposits beget loans in the form of additional deposits
thereby increasing the money supply. This process—the process of
money creation through fractional reserve banking—constitutes one of
the three primary means by which the Federal Reserve conducts
monetary policy; i.e., the means by which the Federal Reserve increases
or decreases the money supply in order to accomplish its dual mandate
of restraining inflation and reducing unemployment.129 Thus, one of the
three primary tools used by the Federal Reserve’s to implement
macroeconomic policy depends upon the existence of deposit insurance.
Let the reader assume for the purposes of this subsection that the
nature of credit expansion brought about by fractional reserve banking
(which is the result of the legal misclassification of ordinary deposits as
loans) is a cause of the business cycle that ultimately results in the
liquidation of the very same investments and loans made by banks with
such misclassified deposits. Specifically, assume that there is something
fundamentally different between loans or investments made with
depositors’ explicit consent, on the one hand, and loans or investments
made without depositors’ explicit consent. It is not the purpose of this
Article to convince the reader (i) that there is indeed a fundamental
difference between voluntary lending/investment and forced
lending/investment,130 or (ii) that artificial credit expansion brought
about by the default classification of ordinary deposits as loans results in
a process that ultimately forces the liquidation of banks’ investments
and loans.
However, these propositions, if true, have significant ramifications
for the theoretically optimal ability of deposit insurance to perform its
intended role. Although a discussion of monetary economics is beyond
the scope of this Article, the net result of banks’ speculative business
activities described above (in particular the making of loans) is an

129. See generally THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS,
supra note 59.
130. Voluntary lending and investment occur when depositors intend a portion of
their deposits be used for lending and investment (and receive interest payments as
compensation for the associated risks). Forced lending and investment occur, for
purposes of this article, solely as a consequence of the default legal rule that classifies
all deposits, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, as loans to banks. Banks
lend or invest such amounts against the intentions of depositors who, as a consequence
of deposit insurance, remain unaware of such use.
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expansion of the money supply, i.e., inflation.131 This is relevant, of
course, because inflation yields a decrease in the purchasing power of
the monetary unit. Thus, the legal classification of an ordinary deposit
as a loan instead of bailment is the first step in a curious process that
reduces the inherent value of the very funds deposited by the unwary
depositor in the first place. In effect, banks fulfill their contractual
obligations to depositors by meeting withdrawal requests with money
that is worth less than when it was deposited. And, the decrease in value
results from lending and investment activities that banks can undertake
only because of the anomalous legal classification of such deposits and
the existence of system-wide deposit insurance. In this regard, the law
has rendered legitimate an activity that would otherwise be classified as
fraudulent—that is, depositors intend that their bank deposits be
bailments that, when withdrawn, will not be devalued as a consequence
of actions taken by the bailee.
CONCLUSION
The default legal classification of ordinary deposits as loans, and
the concomitant establishment of debtor-creditor relationships between
banks and depositors, respectively, conflicts with the ordinary
understanding of depositors.
From the outset of the banking
relationship, the aberrant legal classification undermines the foundations
upon which mutual trust between banks and their depositors could
otherwise develop. It serves as the primary justification for the
existence of the FDIC, which can fulfill its mandate only by making
payments in real terms funded through taxation or in nominal terms
funded through a devaluation of money. In turn, deposit insurance
coupled with the default legal classification of deposits as loans
transform legitimate banking activity into legislatively-induced artificial
credit creation through suboptimal investment and lending fueled by a
nearly inexhaustible supply of demand deposits. All of this consolidates
in the hands of a few financial institutions the power to allocate the
nation’s deposits between savings, on the one hand, and lending or

131. Use of the term “inflation” to mean an increase in the price level as opposed to
an increase in the money supply (which is its proper historical meaning) can be
misleading because the former ignores the deleterious consequences of inflation
unaccompanied by an increase in prices, such as the misallocation of capital.
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investment, on the other.132 But, it leaves depositors, other bank
shareholders, and taxpayers bearing the cost of such failed business
ventures; and, on a massive, systematic scale, decreases the purchasing
power of money deposited in the first instance. In essence, the existing
regulatory structure that provides for deposit insurance plus
misclassified demand deposits equals moral hazard. This moral hazard
contributes to economic and financial instability, yielding the
paradoxical public outcry for further regulation. Lastly, this framework
serves as a conduit through which dubious social policies may be
implemented by politicians not eager publicly to discuss or address such
policies, thereby undermining democratic institutions in the process.
In other words, the legal misclassification of ordinary bank deposits
has contributed to the modern banking system in which: (i) depositors
intend to save a portion of their disposable income without exposure to
the risk of loss, as would be the case if they were to invest or lend it; (ii)
to accomplish this goal, they deposit a portion of their disposable
income into savings or checking accounts, not realizing that by doing so
they are lending to banks; (iii) banks use the majority of these deposits
(i.e., the fraction not required to be maintained as reserves) to make new
investments and loans that depositors would not make directly; (iv)
deposit insurance renders depositors indifferent to the misclassification
of their deposits by appearing to transfer the risk of loss to some other
party; (v) deposit insurance renders banks indifferent to the quality of
such loans and investments; and (vi) as a result, banks make suboptimal
loans and investments that cause economic instability and social
turmoil.133 Simply, banks make risky loans and investments using
checking and savings account deposits made for the very purpose of
avoiding risk, and this divergence in intent is a causal factor that
contributes to bank insolvency, the devaluation of money, opaque
governance, and unwelcome economic and social costs. The legal
misclassification of ordinary demand deposits is an essential component
of the fractional reserve banking system; this is its essential merit.
Offset against this merit, however, should be a full accounting of its
costs.

132. This power results invariably in more investment and/or lending than would
otherwise be the case.
133. For an insightful analysis of the social consequences of a change in the value of
money, see Paul A. Cantor, Hyperinflation and Hyperreality: Thomas Mann in Light of
Austrian Economics, 7 REV. OF AUSTRIAN ECON. 3 (1994); see also JORG GUIDO
HULSMANN, THE ETHICS OF MONEY PRODUCTION (2008).

